1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery

Purpose of 1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery - Federation of American Scientists

10.25.11|3 min read| Text by Steven Aftergood | Link to article

Excerpt:

For two weeks in October 1969, the Nixon Administration secretly placed U.S. nuclear forces on alert.  At the time, the move was considered so sensitive that not even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was briefed on its purpose.  Still today, no conclusive explanation for the potentially destabilizing alert can be found. 

The second proposed explanation is “that the President ordered the alert as a signal to deter a possible Soviet nuclear strike against China during the escalating Sino-Soviet border dispute.”  Consistent with the second interpretation, the FRUS volume provides new documentation of intelligence reports indicating that Soviet leaders were considering a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities.

Read full article:  Purpose of 1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery - Federation of American Scientists

Background: Defcon III: ENCIRCLING OF EGYPT'S THIRD ARMY 

Hotline Messages from Brezhnev to Nixon

Documents 61A and 61B: Hotline Messages from Brezhnev to Nixon, 23 October 1973

Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 20 (October 12-November 27, 1973)

During the afternoon, two messages from Brezhnev to Nixon were sent through the hotline, the first use of that instrumentality since the last Middle East War. 

Brezhnev demanded that "the most decisive measures be taken without delay" by Moscow and Washington to stop the "flagrant" Israeli violations. 

Again, Brezhnev urged new action at the Security Council. Brezhnev's language--"why this treachery was allowed by Israel is more obvious to you"--clearly suggested that he suspected that Washington was behind Israel's military moves. Through the CIA back-channel the Egyptians also got in touch with the White House expressing their worries, with Sadat for the first time directly asking Nixon to "intervene effectively even if that necessitates the use of force."

Sadat spoke of U.S.-Soviet "guarantees" of the cease-fire which was more likely based on Soviet interpretations than on Kissinger's understanding of the Moscow talks. Replying the same day, Nixon told Sadat that Washington had only "guaranteed" efforts to reach a settlement, but that he had directed Kissinger to "make urgent representations" to Israel to comply with the cease-fire. (see Document 44).

Apparently, worried that the IDF might advance further, seize Cairo, and put Sadat in perilous straits, Kissinger called Dinitz from the Situation Room and demanded that the Israelis halt military action. According to the recollection of NSC staffer Robert McFarlane Kissinger "began exhorting [Dinitz]. `Jesus Christ, don't you understand?' 

Suddenly Henry stopped shouting and said, 'Oh.' I was later told that the Israeli calmly explained to Henry that his government might be more persuaded if he invoked a different prophet." (Note 60)

From <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm#doc91a>

***

Background: Memcon between Kissinger and Huang Zhen,

25 October 1973 4:45 - 5:25 p.m.  See below

Background: Escalation: Brezhnev Response

Background: Document 71: Message from Brezhnev to Nixon 24 Oct 1973

Index Notes for Document 71: Message from Brezhnev to Nixon, 24 October 1973, received at State Department, 10:00 p.m.

Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 20 (October 12-November 27, 1973)

Just before 10:00 p.m., Dobrynin called Kissinger and dictated the text of this letter from Brezhnev to Nixon that the Soviet embassy had just received from Moscow. 

Nixon, overwhelmed by Watergate matters, did not see the letter until the next day and played no part in policy discussions that evening. (Note 66) 

Published in its entirety for the first time (Note 67), the letter began with Brezhnev emulating Kissinger's recent communication and addressing Nixon simply as "Mr. President." He indicted the Israelis for "brazenly" violating the cease-fire and continuing "to seize new and new territory from Egypt." To resolve the crisis, 

Brezhnev made a "concrete proposal": "Let us together … urgently dispatch to Egypt the Soviet and American military contingents, to insure the implementation of the decision of the Security Council." Brezhnev would brook no delay. "I will say it to you straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us … we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally." 

This strong letter, former Soviet insider Victor Israelyan later observed, was a Soviet "overreaction" based on Sadat's urgent pleas for help with the Israelis and a pessimistic assessment of the Egyptian military situation. 

Moreover, communications difficulties on the Soviet side preventing the flow of timely information may have accounted for disparities in U.S. and Soviet perceptions on military development in the Middle East. 

Where the Americans saw "quiet," Brezhnev saw onslaught. Hoping that he could pressure the Americans to cooperate and restrain Israel, Brezhnev personally added the sentence on unilateral action. No one in the Politburo intended any military moves in the Middle East or expected a U.S. military reaction to what amounted to a Soviet bluff. 

As Israelyan later remarked, "How wrong was our forecast…!" (Note 68)

Document 71: Message from Brezhnev to Nixon 24 Oct 1973

Message from Brezhnev to Nixon, 

24 October 1973, received at State Department, 10:00 p.m.

***

Mr. President: 

I have received your letter in which you inform me that Israel ceased fighting. The facts, however, testify that Israel continues drastically to ignore the ceasefire decision of the Security Council. Thus, it is brazenly challenging both the Soviet Union and the United States since it is our agreement with You which constitutes the basis of the Security Council decision. In short, Israel simply embarked on the road to defeat. 

It continues to seize new and new territory. As you know, the Israeli forces have already fought their way into Suez. It is impossible to allow such to continue. Let us together, the Soviet Union and the United States urgently dispatch to Egypt Soviet and American military contingents, with their mission the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of August 22 and 23 concerning the cessation of fire and of all military activities and also of the understanding with you on the guarantee of the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council out It is necessary to adhere with/delay. I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently 

It is necessary to adhere without delay. I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel.

We have an understanding with you which we value highly--that is to act jointly. Let us implement this understanding on a concrete case in this complex situation. It will be a good example of our agreed actions in the interest of peace. We have no doubt that all those who are in favor of detente, of peace, of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States will only welcome such joint action of ours. I will appreciate immediate and clear reply from you. 

Respectively, 

L. Brezhnev

***

Document 73 Reaction: Message from Nixon to Brezhnev 25 October 1973, 

October 25, 1973

Mr. General Secretary: 

I have carefully studied your important message of this evening. I agree with you that our understanding to act jointly for peace is of the highest value and that we should implement that understanding in this complex situation. 

I must tell you, however, that your proposal for a particular kind of joint action, that of sending Soviet and American military contingents to Egypt, is not appropriate in the present circumstances. 

We have no information which would indicate that the ceasefire is now being violated on any significant scale. Such violations as are taking place can be dealt with most effectively by increased numbers of observer teams to inform the Security Council of the true responsibility for violations. 

We are prepared to take every effective step to guarantee the implementation of the ceasefire and are already in close touch with the Government of Israel to ensure that it abides fully by the terms of the Security Council decisions. I assume that you are taking similar steps with Egypt. 

In these circumstances, we must view your suggestion of unilateral action as a matter of the gravest concern involving incalculable consequences. 

It is clear that the forces necessary to impose the ceasefire terms on the two sides would be massive and would require closest coordination so as to avoid bloodshed. This is not only clearly infeasible but is not appropriate to the situation. In this situation the Security Council requires accurate information about what is occurring so that it as well as each of us can exert maximum influence in Cairo and Tel-Aviv, respectively, to ensure compliance with the terms of the ceasefire.

To this end, I am prepared to join with you at once to augment the present truce supervisory force by additional men and equipment. I would be prepared to see included in such augmented truce supervisory units a number of American and Soviet personnel, though not combat forces. It would be understood that this is an extraordinary and temporary step, solely for the purpose of providing adequate information concerning compliance by both sides with the terms of the ceasefire. If this is what you mean by contingents, we will consider it.

Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of our agreements this is the time for acting not unilaterally but in harmony and with cool heads. I believe my proposal is consonant with the letter and spirit of our under- standings and would ensure a prompt implementation of the ceasefire. This would establish a base from which we could move into the negotiations foreseen by Security Council Resolution 338 which we shall jointly sponsor. 

I will await a prompt and positive reply from you on these proposals. Meanwhile, I will order the necessary preparations for the steps I have outlined. Upon receipt of your agreement, I will immediately designate representatives to work out the modalities with your representatives. 

You must know, however, that we could in no event accept unilateral action. This would be in violation of our understandings, of the agreed Principles we signed in Moscow in 1972 and of Article II of the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War. As I stated above, such action would produce incalculable consequences which would be in the interest of neither of our countries and which would end all we have striven so hard to achieve.

***

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Kissinger Debrief with China Ambassador Huang Chen 25 Oct 1973

25 October 1973 4:45 - 5:25 p.m.

Document 72: Memcon between Kissinger and Huang Zhen, 25 October 1973, 4:45 - 5:25 p.m.

Source: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977. Box 374. China - Sensitive July 1973 - February 1974

The Soviet "overreaction" sparked an American "overreaction." (Note 69) Believing, fearing that the Soviets might actually intervene and misinterpreting a stand down of Moscow's airlift to Egypt as a portent of armed intervention, Kissinger decided it was necessary to "go to the mat." At a meeting of the WSAG that lasted into the early morning, Kissinger and his colleagues discussed Brezhnev's letter, its implications, and the U.S. response. 

Whatever the Soviets actually intended, the participants treated Brezhnev's letter as a significant challenge that required a stern response. NSC staffer William Quandt, who saw Brezhnev's letter as a bluff, later said that "we wanted to teach him a lesson." At 11:41 p.m., Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Thomas Moorer ordered U.S. military commands to raise their alert levels to DEFCON (Defense Condition) III which meant putting nuclear-armed units on the "highest state of peacetime alert" (DEFCON II would mean that nuclear forces were ready for imminent use). 

In addition, as the WSAG became aware of other Soviet military moves---the alerting of some East German units and the preparation of transport planes to fly to Egypt from Budapest--it reinforced the DEFCON III by alerting the 82nd Airborne Division and ordering movements of aircraft carriers toward the Eastern Mediterranean. 

In this account of a meeting the next afternoon with PRC liaison office chief Huang Zhen, Kissinger provided a general account of the communications with the Soviets on 24 October and the actions taken by the WSAG during the night of 24/25 October. Interestingly, Kissinger treated Brezhnev's threat as a "bluff" although years later he stated that "I did not see it as a bluff, but it made no difference. We could not run the risk that [it was not] … We had no choice except to call the bluff."

Besides trying to signal the Soviets, Kissinger may have also meant the DEFCON as a message to the Israelis: the United States could not tolerate violations of the cease-fire because of the danger to world peace. (Note 70)

**

Kissinger Debrief with China Ambassador Huang Chen 25 Oct 1973

25 October 1973 4:45 - 5:25 p.m.

Document 72: Memcon between Kissinger and Huang Zhen, 25 October 1973, 4:45 - 5:25 p.m.

Transcript of Meeting with Ambassador Huang

Note, Zhou Enlai is  Premier of China

Meeting Notes / Transcript

Participants:  

• Ambassador Huang Chen

• Chief of PRC Liaison Office

• Han Hsu, PRC Liaison Office

• Chi Chao Chu, PRC Liaison Office

• Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State

• Multiple Assistant Secretaries

• Winston Lord, Director of Planning & Coordination

Amb. Huang: You were up all night. 

Kissinger: Your allies tried to throw their weight around last night. I thought I would bring you up to date on what has been happening for the benefit of the Prime Minister. First, let me tell you about the situation last night and today, and then I'll go back to the Moscow trip. First, Mr. Ambassador, our policy has been what I told you the first night. We have one principal objective, to keep the Soviet military presence out of the Middle East and to reduce the Soviet political influence as much as possible. I know you are going to disagree with these objectives violently. (Laughter) 

Amb. Huang: Not necessarily: 

Kissenger: But we will pursue them regardless of your recommendations. 

Amb. Huang: I watched your entire TV press conference today. 

Kissenger: (To Mr. Sisco) The Prime Minister says I am the only man who can speak a half an hour without saying anything. I was not offended by what he said, simply that he gave away my secret. ng: You are very much interested in these words of the Prime Minister, and Chiao Kuan-kwa also told you how the Prime Minister explained them. Let's go through yesterday. We received in the morning some Soviet complaints that the cease- fire was being violated. We believed them and, therefore, we brought very great pressure on Israel to stop what they were doing. But then we found out that Israel was not doing anything. We also found out that the Egyptians were not doing anything; that it was a rather quiet day. 

All day long the complaints were getting louder and louder in a way that we couldn't do anything about. At four o'clock I saw Dobrynin, and he discussed with me only the question of how we get the poli- tical negotiations started. At the end, we discussed what would happen at the Security Council, and he said the only instructions to their representatives were to vote for the resolution about the ceasefire. 

At 7:30, Dobrynin called me and said they had changed instructions now and would vote for the resolution introduced by somebody else that the Soviet and American forces be introduced into the Middle East. We told them we would veto such a resolution. You remember we called you and recommended that you might consider vetoing, too. 

At 10:15.we received a message from the Soviet Union which was very brutal in language and which, in effect, said that we should immediately agree to send a joint force with them into the Middle East, and if we didn't agree to send a joint force with them, they would send Soviet forces alone. We were not prepared to send a joint force with the Soviet Union because of the impression of condominium, because our objectives were not the same as theirs, and because we did not want to establish the principle that Soviet combat forces could be transported over long distances into foreign countries. 

So I called the Soviet Ambassador and told him he would get an answer later, and I called a meeting of the National Security Council. That is when we put our military forces on the alert. 

We moved our fleet to the eastern part of the Mediterranean and put another aircraft carrier into the western part of the Mediterranean. And only after we were sure that the Soviets would have picked up all these movements did we send them a reply in which we said we were prepared to send individual observers, but not combat personnel, only as part of the UN observer force. But if the Soviet Union would act unilaterally, it would have the gravest consequences and would violate the principles we signed and violate Article II of the Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear War. I know you won't like me to invoke that treaty. So we used the treaty as I told the Prime Minister we would use it. And we also told the Soviet Ambassador that we would not receive any other communication until we had replied to this one.

 So at the United Nations today you know what happened. We refused to join any resolution unless it excluded permanent members from any force. So now the Soviet Union is excluded from sending a force except as part of the United Nations. About one and one-half hours ago we received a reply from the Soviets that they were sending 70 individual observers and no military contingents. 

Ambassador Huang: That would mean that you will also send individual observers? 

Kissinger: Maybe, but we haven't decided yet. Our major concern was that they had alerted 7 of their 8 airborne divisions. (To Sisco) Was it 7 out of 8 or 6 out of 7? 

Assistant Secretary Sisco - I think it was 7 out of 8 but I'm not sure. 

Kissinger: They had assembled all their air transportation to move them. We are not concerned with individual personnel in Egypt -- they have been there before but we were determined to resist introduction of combat units. Now about our strategy. As far as the discussions in Moscow were concerned, they dealt only with the Middle East and only with the Security Council resolution. There was no other subject. I don't think their affection for you has increased in recent months, but it was not a subject they pursued. Our major concern was that, since they were defeated, not to purth mat form to the point where it would produce a military confrontation. 

Ambassador Huang: Who was defeated? 

Kissinger:  Basically, the Egyptians were defeated and, therefore, so were the Russians. We weren't asking for a ceasefire. We will now pursue the policy I discussed with the Vice Foreign Minister of strengthening our relation with Arab countrie I am considering stopping in a few Arab countries specifically including Cairo, on the way to Peking And I wanted to ask you whether it might be possible for you if we entered China the way I did on my first trip through Pakistan. I thought I would go from Cairo to Tehran to Rawalpindi to see President Bhutto and go up to Peking from there. 

***(There was some discussion among the Chinese.)***

You will have to ask your government. Or maybe we could come around that area and go to Shanghai.

Amb Huang: We will report this to our government and tell you very quickly. 

Kissinger: Of course. We think this is an opportune moment to visit those countries and it fits in with the general views expressed by Chiao Kuan-hua when I last saw him. And it will be in the spirit o that we discussed that I would be making those stops. 

This is what I wanted to inform you of and, of course, answer any questions you might have. 

Amb Huang: Thank you for the information about this. We will report this immediately to Prime Minister Chou En-lai. I would like to ask from your point of view what you estimate the developing situation in the Middle East to be. 

Kissinger: My honest view is that the Soviet Union has suffered a major strategic defeat, and that's why they tried to bluff us last night. For the third time now its friends have lost most of the equipment the Soviet Union gave them. Even the Arab leaders have had to learn that they can get military equipment from the Soviet Union, but if they want to make diplomatic progress, they have to deal with us. 

And since we are not anti-Arab we will help them now make diplomatic progress. 

So we now have a very good position to reduce the Soviet political influence. This is our assessment of the outcome. They will bluff us from time to time and make some threatening noises, but their nerves are not as good as their bluffs. 

Amb Huang: What are the United States and the Soviet Union planning to do in the future? There will be formal cooperation between the Soviet Union and us to encourage negotiations. The Soviet Union will try to create the impression that they pushed us into it. But since the Soviet Union can deliver nothing, we will have our bilateral discussions with the Arabs as well. 

You must distinguish appearance from reality. 

There may be some face-saving things, but we will determine for ourselves what will be done. Western concern with face. 

Amb Huang: The Orientals are very much concerned with face, Amb Huang: with self-respect. Very honestly speaking, I would like to say that the practice of the United States and the Soviet Union that they were doing during the Security Council meetings of the 22nd and 23rd, of putting in a resolution agreed upon by themselves, but not letting other countries consult or receive instructions from their governments, is a practice we find intolerable. And Vice Minister Chiao Kuan-hu made that quite clear in the Security Council. At the Security Council meeting, others didn't even want him to finish his speech. 

Kissinger: I hope our representative didn't bring any pressure Secretary: on you. But practically both the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed the resolution in the Security Council with- out giving time to the other members to consult or to ask instructions from their governments. 

Amb Huang: But practically both the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed the resolution in the Security Council without giving time to the other members to consult or to ask instructions from their governments. 

Secretary: I agree with you. This was an exceptional circumstance in which the Egyptian forces would have been completely wiped out if the war continued another 24 hours. 

Amb Huang: I don't agree with that estimate. From the very beginning our views were different on this point. The U.S. said at the very beginning that in 72 to 96 hours the Arabs would be defeated. 

Secretary: I underestimated. 

Amb Huang: It went on for 16 or 17 days, and as Chiao Kuan- hwa has made very clear, it was a big victory for the Arabs. It was not the six-day war of 1967. On this point we differ. I do not wish to go further. 

Secretary: We have different public assessments, but we still have to have realistic private assessments. I underestimated the length of time, but I did not underestimate the outcome.

Amb Huang: But there is a fundamental difference of assessments here. We look at the perspective of which side is just and which side is not just. Also, we consider that, while weapons are important, people who use the weapons are even more important.

You can see that the Arab peoples have, during the past several decades, suffered humiliations, ever since the British trusteeship of Palestine in 1947. And in the creation of Israel there were two states one in Palestine and one in Israel with the support of the big powers on the 5th of June 1948. On the second day, Israel launched attacks on the Arab states and the Arabs in the Palestinian area, about one million, were driven out homeless. And for these several decades the Palestinians and Arabs are without their homes and have to live in refugee camps After the war in 1967, our Arab friends felt humiliated. That was why the Arab people suffered so much in the 1967 war. The Soviet Union gave them weapons, but they did not let them use them. The purpose was to control them. Under the circumstances, of course, the Arab people could not have their concerns met. Under the provocation of Israel, the Arabs fight back, as the Vice Minister made clear in his speech at the Security Council. He pointed out that the Arabs fought very heroically, and they victoriously hoisted the Egyptian flag east of the Suez. And on the Golan Heights it was not so easy for Israel; the Syrians put up a very firm struggle. Mr. Dayan claimed that the Israeli forces would take Damascus, but they did not. And the Palestinian Arabs, too, put up a heroic struggle. Other Arab countries and peoples participated in the battle. And the unity and strength of the people have increased. I'm not very clear on the present situation. 

There is strength in the situation of the Arab people. At this or that time, there may be military setbacks, but I do not share your assessment that they have been defeated. We are firmly convinced that the side of justice will finish with victory. So long as territories are not restored and so long as the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs have not been resolved, there cannot be peace. 

Regarding what the U.S. and the Soviet Union did, I am frankly expressing my views. In the end, the Arabs will certainly be victorious. 

Kissinger: We are not anti-Arab. Our principal objective is to prevent Soviet influence, as I told you on the first day. We take very seriously what the Vice Minister said in New York. You will see that we will pursue a very active policy toward the Arabs. I agree with you that they have wiped out the humiliation of the past years, and they fought very heroically. 

Amb Huang: I just wanted to say these things, and then I won't go on any longer. We are old friends. We have differences of view, but we are old friends. And you do know that we do sympathize with the just cause of the Arab people.

Kissinger: We are not asking you to abandon this. 

Amb Huang: And as we said in the past, we are not against the Jewish people; we are opposed to Zionism and Zionist aggression. That's what the Arabs say, too.

And what is more, I myself being a soldier, I don't believe the theory that weapons decide everything. Because if the weapons were more decisive, then the Chinese revolution would never have been victorious. And George Washington would never have been victorious. And many others, too. 

Kissinger: And Winston Lord would be deprived of all hope of taking over the State Department. Mr. Ambassador, our present plan is to leave here on the 5th or 6th of November and then go to Cairo and then into China. If you could let us know at your convenience whether we can come in via Pakistan, it would be a sentimental journey. (Laughter) 

**

U.S. Military Engaged in Yom Kippur War

Countering Soviet Threat of Unilateral Action; Bailing out Israelis…again

References made by Kissinger and Historical Record

82nd Airborne Division

Mission Statement: On order, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division rapidly deploys within 18 hours of notification, strategically deploys, conducts forcible entry parachute assaults and secures key objectives for follow-on military operations in support of U.S. national interests.

The 82nd Airborne Division is an active airborne infantry division of the United States Army specializing in joint forcible entry operations. Based at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, the 82nd Airborne Division is the primary fighting arm of the XVIII Airborne Corps. The 82nd Division was constituted in the National Army on August 5th, 1917, and was organized on August 25th, 1917, at Camp Gordon, Georgia. Since its initial members came from all 48 states, the unit acquired the nickname "All American," which is the basis for its famed "AA" shoulder patch.

Learn More: 82nd Airborne Division

U.S. Aerial Lift to Support Israel - Operation Nickel Grass

Source: Air Mobility Command Museum.

From <https://amcmuseum.org/history/operation-nickel-grass/>

 In response to an urgent request from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, President Richard M. Nixon initiated an aerial resupply operation to Israel starting on 13 October. Nicknamed NICKEL GRASS, the airlift soon proved the value of maintaining a responsive and efficient military airlift system. For the next 32 days, MAC C-141 and C-5 cargo transports streamed steadily into Lod International Airport at Tel Aviv from onload points throughout the United States carrying urgently needed war materials. The aerial resupply was conducted with an en route stop at Lajes Field in the Azores, approximately one half of the one-way distance of 6,450 nautical miles from the United States to Israel. Given the diplomatic sensitivities associated with so much of the world’s dependence on Arab oil, the C-141 and the C-5 flight routes over the Mediterranean carefully avoided the airspace of all the nations in the region.

Selected Analysis

Not Necessarily Accurate analysis, but good sources that may not have used the archival record.

Analysis

The Hidden Calculation behind the Yom Kippur War | 2003 Hudson Instiute

1976 RAND Corporation | William Quandt | Analysis Soviet Role in Yom Kippur War

Israel’s 1973 October War: A 50-year perspective | Brookings

III. Coordinated Offensives

Document 14: Message from Soviet Government to Nixon and Kissinger, 6 October 1973, called in at 2:10 p.m.

Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 27-Arab-Isr

This message conveys Brezhnev's and the Politburo's concern about the Middle East "conflagration." Although far from straightforward about when they first learned of Sadat's war plans, the Soviets were no less shocked than the Americans by the Egyptian and Syrian decisions for war. For Brezhnev and his colleagues, war was a "gross miscalculation," a "major political error," because they believed that the Arabs were sure to lose. Recognizing the danger of the situation for superpower relations, during the first days of the war the Soviets pressed their Egyptian and Syrian clients for a cease-fire. At the same time, however, Brezhnev wanted to maintain Soviet influence in the region, thus, Soviet policy had to avoid a military and political disaster for Egypt and Syria. The tension between détente and credibility concerns would shape Soviet policy throughout the conflict. (Note 25)

Document 15: Memorandum from William Quandt and Donald Stukel, NSC Staff, "WSAG Meeting -- Middle East, Saturday, October 6, 1973, 3:00 p.m."

Source: NPMP, National Security Council Institutional Files, box H-94, WSAG Meeting, Middle East 10/6/73 7:30 pm., folder 1

As Israelis were observing Yom Kippur, the Egyptians and Syrians launched their attacks. Just after 2:00 p.m. (Cairo time) 100,000 Egyptian troops and 1,000 tanks engulfed Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal while 35,000 Syrian troops and 800 tanks broke through Israeli positions on the Golan Heights. (Note 26) Providing Kissinger with some background information for another WSAG meeting, held early that evening, NSC staffers believed that senior officials had to start considering a number of issues, such as steps to minimize threats to U.S. interests, e.g., an Arab oil embargo, possible Soviet moves, and the "consequences of a major Arab defeat." With respect to the Soviet position, Kissinger's advisers believed that the key question was how Washington could "best take advantage of this crisis to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East." But if Moscow's influence was to be reduced, it could not be the result of a "major Arab defeat" because that could endanger U.S. interests in the region, destroy the possibility of a settlement, and weaken "moderate" Arab regimes. The advantages of finding ways to "minimize" Arab "loss of face" required serious consideration.

Document 16: Memorandum to Kissinger, initialed "LSE" [Lawrence S. Eagleburger], 6 October 1973

Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr

At the outset, the Israelis did not want UN Security Council action on a cease-fire because it could prevent them from reversing initial Arab gains. During a conversation with Foreign Minister Abba Eban at 9:07 a.m, Kissinger indirectly assured him that Washington would not immediately go to the Security Council; this satisfied Eban because it would let the Israelis decide whether to "[do] it quickly." While Kissinger would soon consider Security Council action to stop the fighting, the Israeli position on a cease-fire influenced his thinking. Sometime during the day, Eban spoke with Kissinger's executive assistant, Lawrence Eagleburger, (Kissinger must have been temporally occupied) and registered his appreciation that Kissinger would defer UN action so that Israel had "time to recoup its position." In other words, the Israelis sought a cease-fire based on the status quo ante. To give the Israelis time to do that, Eban asked for a delay on any Security Council action until Monday. By the time Eban spoke with Kissinger later in the day, the latter had seen Eagleburger's memo and Eban had nothing to worry about. Having decided that Washington had to "lean" toward Tel Aviv in order to restrain the Arabs and the Soviets but also to get more leverage over the Israelis during the negotiating phase, Kissinger tacitly assured the foreign minister that Washington would not be "precipitate" in seeking Security Council Action. In any event, the Soviets were interested in a cease-fire and so was Assad--if the fighting stopped he would have control of the Golan Heights. Sadat, however, was not ready to halt until he had a stronger position on the Sinai. (Note 27)

Document 17: Memcon between Kissinger and Ambassador Huang Zhen, PRC Liaison Office, 6 October 1973, 9:10- 9:30 p.m.

Source: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977. Box 328. China Exchanges July 10-October 31, 1973

Back in Washington, at the close of the day Kissinger had one of his confidential talks with Huang Zhen, Beijing's representative in Washington. Rather frankly, Kissinger disclosed elements of his grand strategy; he assured the Chinese that "our strategic objective is to prevent the Soviets from getting a dominant position in the Middle East." Believing that the Israelis would achieve a quick victory over the Arabs in a few days, Kissinger wanted to demonstrate to the Arab states that "whoever gets help from the Soviet Union cannot achieve his objective." Moreover, to the extent that the Arabs believed that they could win some territory before agreeing to halt the fighting, Kissinger wanted to slap down that belief by supporting a cease-fire based on a "return to the status quo ante." The Chinese were sympathetic to the Arab cause so Kissinger had to be able to assure progress on Arab grievances. Once negotiations begin, "we will have to separate ourselves from the Israeli point of view to some extent." That would be possible, however, if Washington could offer security guarantees for "new borders after the settlement."

Document 18: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 7 October 1973, 8:20 p.m.

Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-1977. Box 25. Cat C 1974 Arab-Israeli War

The first page of this document is mostly illegible--except for a few scraps on U.S. supply of Sidewinder (air-to-air) missiles and bomb racks--but it provides interesting detail on the early moments of the war, such as Israeli cabinet debates on the question of whether to preempt or not. Apparently advice that Kissinger had given in the past--"whatever happens, don't be the one that strikes first"--played no small part in Meir's thinking. With war underway, Kissinger assumed that Israeli forces would soon reverse Egyptian advances; therefore, he wanted to delay action at the UN Security Council to enable the IDF to "move as fast as possible." The Israelis were seeking military aid---Sidewinder missiles, planes, ordnance, ammunition, and aircraft parts--but aircraft was the priority of the moment. Kissinger, however, was not so sure that aircraft could be provided "while the fighting is going on," although he thought it possible to make Sidewinders and bomb racks available. As for the Soviets, Kissinger did not show much concern: "in all their communications with us, they were very mild."

Document 19: Department of State, Operations Center, Middle East Task Force, Situation Report # 8, "Situation in the Middle East, as of 2300 Hours (EDT, Oct. 7, 1973"

Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 1173, 1973 War (Middle East) 7 Oct. 1973 File No. 2

During the first day of the fighting, Arab forces made significant gains--the Syrians had penetrated the Golan Heights while the Egyptians had moved into the Sinai past the east bank of the Suez Canal. Given the great strategic value of the Golan Heights, so close to Israeli population centers, the Israelis started to throw in forces there first. (Note 28) To keep officials abreast of developments, the State Department's Middle East Task Force, lodged at the Department's basement Operations Center, regularly issued "sitreps" on military and political developments. This one, produced at the end of the second day of the fighting, showed a grim situation: "major losses on both sides," a "miserably tough day" for the Israelis.

Document 20: Kissinger to Egyptian Foreign Minister Al-Zayyat, 8 October 1973, enclosing "Message for Mr. Hafiz Ismail from Dr. Kissinger," 8 October 1973

Source: NPMP, HAKO, box 132, Egypt/Ismail Vol. VII October 1-21, 1973

Within a day after the war broke out, Sadat's security adviser, Haifez Ismail, sent Kissinger a secret message, through the Cairo CIA station, outlining his government's war aims. The message remains classified and Kissinger found its basic terms---restoration of 1967 borders--unacceptable, but he saw it as extraordinarily significant: it treated Washington as the key player in the peace process but also showed Sadat's moderation; he did not seek to "widen the confrontation." (Note 29) Kissinger quickly responded, asking Sadat and Ismail to clarify points about territorial withdrawal. He also asked about the substance of a backchannel message from Sadat to the Shah of Iran that the Iranians showed to U.S. Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms. Given Kissinger's expectation that the Israelis would soon be overtaking the Egyptians, he may have anticipated that Ismail and Sadat would be interested in his offer to "bring the fighting to a halt" and "personally participate in assisting the parties to reach a just resolution" of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Document 21A: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 9 October 1973, 8:20-8:40 a.m.

Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 25, CAT C Arab-Israeli War

Document 21B: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 9 October 1973, 6:10-6:35 p.m.

Source: RG 59, SN 70-73, Pol Isr-US

Early in the morning of 9 October, Kissinger received a call from Dinitz that Israeli forces were in a more "difficult" position. A counter-offensive launched the previous day had failed with major losses. At 8:20, the two met for a more detailed conversation, with a chagrined Dinitz acknowledging that the Israelis had lost over 400 tanks to the Egyptians and 100 to the Syrians. Egyptian armor and surface-to-air missiles were taking their toll in the air and ground battle and the Israeli cabinet had decided that it had to "get all equipment and planes by air that we can." Kissinger, who had assumed that Tel Aviv could recapture territory without major infusions of aid, was perplexed by the bad news--"Explain to me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians?"--and the diplomatic implications of substantial U.S. wartime military aid was troublesome. As indicated on the record of the 8:20 a.m. meeting, Dinitz and Kissinger met privately, without a notetaker, to discuss Golda Meir's request for a secret meeting with Nixon to plea for military aid, a proposal that Kissinger quickly dismissed because it would strengthen Moscow's influence in the Arab world. To underline the urgency of the situation, Dinitz may have introduced an element of nuclear blackmail into the private discussion. While Golda Meir had rejected military advice for nuclear weapons use, she had ordered the arming and alerting of Jericho missiles--their principal nuclear delivery system--at least to influence Washington. (Note 30) Kissinger has never gone on record on this issue and no U.S. documentation on the U.S. Israeli nuclear posture during the war has been declassified. Whatever Dinitz said, Kissinger was responsive to the pleas for more assistance. Later, when the WSAG considered the Israeli position, it recommended the supply of arms as long as Washington kept a low profile. Meeting Dinitz later in the day, Kissinger told him that Nixon had approved the entire list of "consumable" items sought by the Israelis (except for laser bombs) would be shipped. Moreover, aircraft and tanks would be replaced if the need became "acute." To ensure that the U.S. role had low visibility, Israeli cargo plans would have the El Al markings painted out. Moreover, discussion of arrangements to charter U.S. commercial aircraft for shipping war material began on the U.S. side. During that meeting, Dinitz had better news to report: progress on the Golan Heights and the massive destruction of Syrian tanks.

Document 22: William Quandt to Kissinger, "Middle Eastern Issues," 9 October 1973

Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 664, Middle East War Memos & Misc. Oct. 6-Oct 17, 1973

Pointing to risky developments--Israel's losses and request for supplies, the probability that fighting would "drag on" for more days, threats to U.S. citizens in Lebanon, calls from Kuwait for use of the oil weapon, and reports of Soviet casualties from Israeli bombing in Syria--Quandt advised Kissinger that he would have to consider decisions on a number of problems. Meeting Israel's arms requests "too visibly" could endanger U.S. citizens but holding back would undermine Tel Aviv's confidence in U.S. policy. For Quandt, the "key problem" was a cease-fire. The earlier position favoring a cease-fire based on the status quo ante had become less and less tenable because of the "prospects for increasingly serious threats to US interests if the fighting is prolonged." Pushing for a "ceasefire in place," however, was likely to "irritate" the Israelis, who were trying to recover lost territory. Tel Aviv might charge a high price, such as "strong" diplomatic and military support after the war, but Quandt thought it might be "worth the cost." Whatever impact this suggestion may have had on Kissinger's thinking, he brought up the possibility of a cease-fire in place during a phone conversation with Dinitz later in the day. (Note 31)

The October War and U.S. Policy, William Burr, editor

Source: National Security Archive

From <The October War and U.S. Policy>

Fifty years ago, on 6 October 1973 at 2:00 p.m. (Cairo time), Egyptian and Syrian forces launched coordinated attacks on Israeli forces in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Known variously as the October War or the Yom Kippur War, this conflict lasted until late October when Washington and Moscow, working through the United Nations, forced a cease-fire on the warring parties. The October war had a fundamental impact on international relations not only by testing the durability of U.S.-Soviet détente but also by compelling the United States to put the Arab-Israeli conflict on the top of its foreign policy agenda. The threat of regional instability, energy crises, and superpower confrontation, made a U.S. hands-on role in the region inescapable. Since the fall of 1973, Washington has played a central role in the protracted, if checkered, effort to address the conflicting security and territorial objectives of Arabs and Israelis. Recently declassified U.S. archival material, unearthed by the National Security Archive, provides critically important information on American policies, perceptions, and decisions during the conflict.

***

Kissinger Told Soviet Envoy during 1973 Arab-Israeli War:

“My Nightmare is a Victory for Either Side” – The Soviet Agreed

New Kissinger Telcons Shed Light on U.S. Policy during the War as Well as Nixon's Nomination of Gerald Ford for Vice President Nixon Described Ford to HAK as a “Bright Truman” Posting Comes on Anniversary of Nixon's Resignation in 1974

From <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/henry-kissinger/2019-08-09/kissinger-told-soviet-envoy-during-1973-arab-israeli-war-my-nightmare-victory-either-side-soviet>

Washington, D.C., August 9, 2019 – Several previously unknown Henry Kissinger memoranda of telephone conversations – or telcons – from October 1973, uncovered by the National Security Archive, provide blunt and fascinating vignettes from a significant moment during the Nixon presidency. 

In one record about the Yom Kippur War, the secretary of state candidly tells Soviet envoy Anatoly Dobrynin it would be a “nightmare” if either side won.  In another, the president comments that Gerald Ford, who would soon be named vice president, was a “safe” choice, reminding Nixon of a “bright Truman.”  That telcon consisted of a somewhat disjointed conversation with the president that prompted Kissinger to confide in his deputy later that the “President was loaded.”

The telcons posted today, on the anniversary of Nixon's resignation as president, were included in the National Archives' response to a declassification request by the National Security Archive 19 years ago, in 2000.  It is not clear why they were not part of the previously known major collections released since 2004 by the National Archives and the State Department largely in response to the threat of legal action

From <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/henry-kissinger/2019-08-09/kissinger-told-soviet-envoy-during-1973-arab-israeli-war-my-nightmare-victory-either-side-soviet>

THE DOCUMENTS

Document 1: Ray Cline [Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research] to Acting Secretary [Kenneth Rush], "Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities With Israel," 31 May 1973, Secret, excised copy

Source: Central Intelligence Agency

Document 2: U.S. Intelligence Community Staff, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report," December 1973, Top Secret, Excised copy

Source: release by Interagency Security Classification Appeal Panel in response to mandatory review request

The CIA has published the post-mortem in its October War on-line document collection http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/1973-12-20-CM.pdf but only the first 11 pages, leaving out the interesting retrospective on "The Analytic Effort" and the report's recommendations.

From <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB415/> 

[excerpt]

Both of these recently declassified telephone conversation transcripts were previously unknown. Found in a collection of Kissinger material in State Department records at the National Archives, they were declassified in response to an October 2000 request by the National Security Archive. Other Kissinger telephone conversations in this release were with White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and White House counsel Leonard Garment.

The discussions covered by these telcons occurred during the 1973 Middle East War and a major topic was U.S. policy to supply Israel with arms and ammunition.  The coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on 6 October 1973 against Israeli forces in the Sinai and the Golan Heights had come as a shock to Washington.  A State Department intelligence analyst had estimated the possibility of war months earlier and U.S. intelligence had picked up warning signs in the weeks before, but the Nixon administration was relatively complacent.  Never considering the possibility that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would launch war to force negotiations, Kissinger and his Israeli counterparts believed that they could control the pace of diplomacy over territory occupied during the 1967 war. At a staff meetiong on 23 October, State Department analyst Ray Cline captured some of the reasons for pre-war complacency when he observed that "we were brainwashed by the Israelis, who brainwashed themselves.”[1]

When the war broke out, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to make sure that Israel did not lose, but they favored a low profile for the U.S. role, so as not to anger Arab countries that were already suspicious of U.S. policy. Moreover, Kissinger wanted to calibrate supply availabilities to influence Israeli war aims. The telcons from 13 October 1973 are especially revealing because they illustrate Kissinger’s suspicion that the Pentagon was “sabotaging” supply operations, which could risk putting “the whole goddamn strategy out of whack.” After Nixon decided in favor of a large-scale U.S. airlift of supplies, Kissinger told Leonard Garment that “we are going to wind up with the Arabs mad.”

The National Archives released these telcons from a collection “The Records of Henry A. Kissinger,” found in State Department records at the  Archives.  It is essentially a collection of document copies, with (to the best of the editor’s recollection) no original typed copies.  Some of the documents are marked with chapter numbers suggesting that the papers had something to do with the preparation of Henry Kissinger’s memoirs.  The telcons found there are also copies, some of them poorly reproduced second or third generation versions of the originals.

Copies of these telcons cannot be found in the otherwise comprehensive Kissinger telcon collection at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum (a copy of the originals in Kissinger’s Library of Congress collection), which the National Archives secured from Kissinger's papers as a result of legal action threatened by the National Security Archive.  The absence of the telcons from the records at the Nixon Library (or even the Library of Congress) may have been a clerical oversight or a deliberate decision,  but at least copies are available.  This may not be the case for Kissinger’s records of his meetings with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin during 1973-1976, which to date are nowhere to be found, despite the efforts of State Department historians to locate them.

From <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/henry-kissinger/2019-08-09/kissinger-told-soviet-envoy-during-1973-arab-israeli-war-my-nightmare-victory-either-side-soviet>

State Dept Docs: Arab-Israeli Crisis

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, 

Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973 - Office of the Historian

[EXCERPT FROM PREFACE TO THIS VOLUME] This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that document the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries presents a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of both presidents. This volume documents U.S. policymaking toward the Arab-Israeli dispute between January and [Page IV] December 1973, i.e., the months before, during, and immediately after the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.

This volume covers an important period in the history of the U.S. engagement with the Arab-Israeli dispute. The October 1973 War rep[Page V]resented not only a renewed clash of Arab and Israeli forces, it ignited an energy crisis brought on by an Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo against the United States, and led to the threat of a direct superpower confrontation. The war also prompted the United States to undertake an unprecedented role in the pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the dispute.

The core of this volume is U.S. diplomacy during the course of the October 1973 War itself, the outbreak of which, following the attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israeli positions in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights on October 6, 1973, presented the United States with a number of profound and, at times, conflicting concerns. 

In a strictly regional context, the October 1973 War pushed the Nixon administration to weigh Washington’s historic commitment to the security of Israel alongside a desire to avoid an irreparable rift with the Arab world, especially Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia with which the United States had generally maintained good relations. Concurrently, the Nixon administration was compelled to address mounting concerns that the Soviet Union might exploit the tensions in the region, a prospect that would hamper, if not wreck, its pursuit of East-West détente. Within weeks, the shifting tide of the war against the Egyptians pushed the superpowers toward a military confrontation of their own. 

U.S. policymakers sought to prevent the war from triggering a wider, more destructive conflict that would shatter the regional and global power balance. 

The volume provides extensive documentation of the high level contacts between Washington and officials of the belligerent countries, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union. 

Due to the increasing impact of Watergate on Nixon and many of his advisors, Kissinger undertook the management of the conflict and efforts to bring about a negotiated ceasefire. The volume also illustrates the actions undertaken to initiate and execute the massive military re-supply of the Israel Defense Forces following the IDF’s heavy losses during the early stages of the war, the internal institutional politics of the airlift debate, and the largely unsuccessful diplomatic push to win the support for U.S. policy aims by Washington’s Western European allies.

Ambassador Edward Brynn

Acting Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

July 2010

Read the full preface here: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973 - Office of the Historian

NOTES

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973 - Office of the Historian

Abbreviations and Terms

WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG)

The WSAG was established in July 1969 (NSDM 19). It was one of two operational subgroups of the NSC during the Nixon-Ford eras. As opposed to most of the other subgroups of the NSC which were review groups and operated as an issue was being prepared for consideration by the President, the operational groups operated within the framework of already determined policy. The WSAG was a high-level task force responsible for ensuring the coordination of all elements of U.S. Government activities in crisis situations. It served as a management team to assure flexible and timely action by various departments as directed by the President during a fast-developing situation. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs chaired the WSAG. Agencies were represented at the Deputy Secretary level.  The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also included.

From <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/finding-aids/national-security-council-institutional-files-h-files>

President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

This collection highlights the causes and consequences of US Intelligence Community’s (IC) failure to foresee the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. A coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, the day of Yom Kippur. Prior to October 6, the CIA concluded that the Arabs would not attack, so the offensive surprised US policymakers as well as Israel. Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts believed that Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. DI analysis did not explore the possibility that leaders might go to war--even at the risk of losing--to pursue political objectives. According to an internal postmortem, Agency analysis was impaired by preconceptions about Arab military capabilities, information overload, rational actor modeling and groupthink.

View the OPA Press Release and Collection Booklet

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30 November Interagency Review of Middle East Photo Reconnaissance Planning

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394487

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1973-11-30-B.pdf

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A Difficult Relationship: Intelligence Support for Richard M. Nixon by John Helgerson

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839445b

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1996-01-01.pdf

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Arab Oil Cutback and Higher Prices: Implications and Reactions

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d8394561

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1973-10-19E.pdf

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Arab-Israeli Hostilities: Two Scenarios

Document Number: 51112a4b993247d4d839452a

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1973-10-13A-CIA.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394440

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1973-09-29.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839442e

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1973-12-04-A.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839444e

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1973-11-02B.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839440e

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1973-10-15.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943ff

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1973-10-25.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d839440f

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1973-12-01.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394400

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1973-10-12B.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394441

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1973-10-30.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f1

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1973-10-13.pdf

270.12 KB

Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394451

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1973-12-19B.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394411

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1973-11-23A.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394421

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1973-11-05.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394432

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1973-10-24.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394442

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1973-10-09.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d83943f2

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1973-11-10.pdf

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Central Intelligence Bulletin: Arab States-Israel

Document Number: 51112a4a993247d4d8394452

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1973-11-21A.pdf

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From <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/president-nixon-and-role-intelligence-1973-arab-israeli-war>

26-28 October: From War to Political Struggle- the Third Army Crisis Leads to Talks with the Egyptians |